Shanghai is located on the world's third largest river (by volume). Yet it faces the risk of shortages of drinking water. Many decisions and environmental characteristics have contributed to this threat. First, Shanghai has become dependent on water brought into the municipality by rivers. Second, it has become increasingly reliant on water from the Changjiang (Yangzi River), principally in order to control the levels of pollution in the water that enters its treatment plants. Third, for reasons associated with inter-provincial administrative arrangements, the city's water intakes are located within the municipality, within the estuary zone and subject to tidal intrusions of salt water. Fourth, at high tide and when the Changjiang's discharge is low, salt intrudes far into the estuary, beyond the current water intakes. If sea levels rise, these intrusions will become more pronounced. Fifth, large-scale central government infrastructure projects (such as dams and the South-North Transfer) are altering the hydrological characteristics of the river. Such projects raise the probability of salt water intrusions into the water intake zone. The Shanghai and central governments have thus made a series of decisions that, taken together, have led the municipality to rely on a source of drinking water that is increasingly unreliable and subject to the risk of shortages due to salt water intrusions. Why these decisions have been madeindependently -is an important problem for those who would understand the provision of water for cities and the practical efficacy of Chinese governance systems. water shortage of about 7.5 per cent of consumption (Hu 2003) . Despite the abundance of water, there are problems in supplying freshwater to the municipality's residents and industries.
Geographical Research
Many cities face water shortages: in 2000, about 150 million people lived in cities where annual water availability was less than 100 L per person per day; another 886 million lived in cities where for at least one month per year, water availability was less than 100 L per person per day (McDonald et al. 2011) . Perhaps a third of the world's total population have to contend with polluted water (Howard and Bartram 2003) . The distributional issues that underpin these numbers, Shanghai is located where there is plenty of flowing water, much of which can be treated to drinking standards (Tan 2011) , and has an average GDP per capita of nearly USD 20 000: it is not a third world city located in a region of high water stress. Focussing on the supply of residential water, therefore, in this paper we ask how wealthy Shanghai, located adjacent to abundant supplies of freshwater, now faces the risk of water shortages.
Is this a matter of demand caused by population growth and economic development, the kind of explanation identified as scarcity (Falkenmark 1990; Goel 2006; Pereira et al. 2009 )? Such physical or absolute water shortages, an inadequate quantity relative to demand, affect Beijing and Tianjin. In general, such a neo-Malthusian argument ascribes the problem of water shortage to excessive demands from agriculture, industry or consumers, summarised as too much growth of GDP and too many people (Osborn 1948) . In its simple form, this is a problem of quantitative insufficiency; but insufficiency of potable water may also induced by pollution from agricultural or industrial sources, a particularly acute problem in China (Economy 2004) .
Has the risk been produced by the privatisation or commodification of water, which afflict the management of water supplies elsewhere (Bakker 2000; Johnston 2003; Swyngedouw 2005)? This political ecological approach recognises the constraints imposed on social choices by the environment, but argues that social controls over water 's allocation are more fundamental to shortage than absolute scarcity. The provision of water is a form of social relation, dominated by issues of power and economy, by the contrast between water as a human right and water as a commodity. As a commodity, the supply of water is subject to market rules: greater scarcity means higher prices. So commodity water is made scarce in various ways, including "planning models, Different cities face water shortages for different reasons. In some, like Beijing, shortage is absolute: the city's demand exceeds the locally available resource. Elsewhere, privatisation of water supply produced shortages: in Jakarta, for example, the pipe network is neither maintained adequately nor extended to the poorer residents of a city (Kooy and Bakker 2008a, 2008b Our methods are those of hydrology and political economy. We draw upon data about the flow regime of the Changjiang (Finlayson et al. 2013) , pollution loads within the rivers that feed into Shanghai (Xu et al. 2013) , water abstractions from the Changjiang basin (Chen et al. 2013 ) and freshwater-seawater interactions in the Changjiang estuary (Li et al. 2014) , to understand how those characteristics interact with government decisions to produce the problems we see today. We also draw on documentary and secondary sources to identify the decisions that governments have made about water supply.
SHANGHAI'S WATER
There is virtually no recycling of water for residential use (Shanghai Municipal Government 2010b), 2010b), though over 80 per cent of industrial water is reported to be recycled (Shanghai Water Shanghai's population and gross domestic product (GDP) have been growing rapidly. After the beginning of reform, population grew at about one per cent annually, but by 1998 that had Shanghai does, though, have a pollution problem. All of Shanghai's sources of water are heavily polluted. Some parts of Taihu are seriously polluted and subject to eutrophication (Qin et al. 2010) . Water continues to be extracted from Taihu via the Huangpujiang, but the water intake has been relocated (Zhang, 1997) . The Huangpujiang water in Shanghai is generally of Grade IV of the Chinese national standard ('for general industrial water supply and recreational waters in which there is not direct human contact with the water': World Bank 2006); pollution loads are unlikely to be reduced in the foreseeable future (Chen et al., 2002) . The Changjiang is less polluted than the Huangpujiang (Grades II or III, both 'suitable for centralized drinking water supply': World Bank plant is a joint venture between Veolia and a state water processing company). There is, however, a scarcity of clean drinking water; the costs of purified water are such that the poorer residents in the city must be largely excluded from using it. Improved treatment and a better pipe distribution system could offset this problem. Nevertheless, there is a looming shortage, that arises neither from an inadequate amount of water flowing down the Changjiang, nor its polluted state, and it is this problem that is the focus of the remainder of this paper. That shortage originates in decisions taken at various levels and locations of government within China and in the manner in which those decisions interact with the characteristics of the physical environment.
DEPENDING ON THE CHANGJIANG
Until recently Shanghai sourced over 80 per cent of its water from Taihu via the Huangpujiang (Figure 1 ). The remainder came from the Changjiang, local surface water sources within the municipality (also heavily polluted) and groundwater. Water continues to be extracted from the Huangpujiang (Zhang, 1997) , but the supply of water from Taihu via the Huangpujiang is insufficient to meet Shanghai's rapidly growing needs (Chen 2011 , Tan 2011 
LOCATING INTAKE PIPES
Shanghai municipality draws water from the Changjiang through water intakes that are located within its boundaries, and that are therefore within the estuary zone (Figures 1 and 2 ). The In other words, Shanghai was encouraged to locate intake pipes in the stretch of the Changjiang that lies within the municipality -in the estuary. Although there were debates about where within the municipality to build storages (Wang et al. 2011) , these came after the crucial decision -to locate the intakes within the municipality. And that decision was driven by the Chinese system of administering multi-province river basins (Webber et al. 2008) . 
DISCHARGE AND SALT WATER INTRUSIONS
The Changjiang has low inter-annual variability of discharge (McMahon et al. 1992) . More important though is the fact that the Changjiang's discharge is highly seasonal (Figure 3 ). On average, discharge in January and February is less than 12 000 m .
Because of such salt water intrusions, the municipal government had to build a water storage, once it decided to use water from the Changjiang and to locate intakes within Shanghai municipality. The capacity of the storage, roughly two months supply, is intended to exceed the anticipated lengths of periods of salt water intrusion.
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
The discharge of the Changjiang is affected by glacier degradation (though meltwater comprises only 0.13 per cent of the runoff of the Changjiang basin: Xie et al., 2004) , an increase in winter and summer precipitation which offsets decreases in spring and autumn precipitation (Jiang et al., 2005 , Qin et al., 2005 and changes in land cover (the catchment scale effects of which are unclear:
Finlayson et al. 2013). More important than any of these, though, are dams and water diversion projects, which are altering the hydrological characteristics of the river. (2) the Water Diversion Project in Taizhou (Jiangsu), which has a total capacity of 1.9 10 9 m 3 . These smaller inter-basin transfers will also reduce discharge of the Changjiang (Chen et al. 2013) . The net effect of these new constructions on discharge (and therefore on the probability of salt water intrusion into the estuary) can only be approximately determined, because the operation Table 2 illustrates the potential effects of the various interbasin transfers and sea level rise on discharge at the estuary.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
When discharge is normal, before the diversions and interbasin transfers, average discharge at the estuary is close to the predicted discharge for saline intrusions of 250 mg/L in January and
February. The diversions and transfers reduce flows in those months below the critical value; but they do not cause other months' discharges to fall below the critical value; December flows are close to the critical discharge. In a normal year, therefore, diversions and discharges intensify but do not extend the period of risks to Shanghai's water supply. In a dry year, however, discharge in December, January and February is below the critical discharge for salt water intrusions of 250 mg/L. The diversions and transfers will force discharges in these months even further below the critical value and extend the period of below-critical flows into March. In normal years, the transfers and diversions will intensify the low flows in January and February but not extend them into March; but in relatively dry years, the low flows of December -February are intensified and perhaps extend into March. Under these conditions, the storage at Qingcaosha is insufficient to meet Shanghai's present demand for water. estuary. Yet these physical conditions are important because other, social conditions led the municipal government to rely on the Changjiang rather than other sources of supply, constrained the government to locate storages and intake pipes within the municipality rather than where salt is not an issue, and threaten to make the problem of salt water intrusions even more difficult to overcome.
In the face of these conditions, the Shanghai and central governments have thus made a series of decisions that, taken together, led the municipality to rely mainly on a source of drinking water that is increasingly unreliable (even if its annual discharge is huge and its annual variability small).
Why these decisions have been made -and with little apparent reference to each other -is an important topic for those who study the provision of water for cities and the practical efficacy of Chinese governance systems.
The decisions reflect the Chinese environmental governance systems. Environmental governance in China is subordinate to the dictates of growth (Naughton 2007) . This growth has, since 1993 at least, been enabled through a series of reforms consistent with neoliberal economic theory (Harvey 2003) , in which the market has become the principal means of regulating the economy and allocating goods and services. At the same time, the state remains in control of key sectors, of which water is one. In China that control is hierarchical -implemented through a vertical hierarchy that begins at the State Council and runs down through ministries to bureaus at provincial, prefectural/municipal, county, township and even village levels.
Even though China is a unitary state and administration is formally hierarchical, the governance of water remains deeply problematic, as Shanghai's water management decisions
indicate. These problems include:
• lack of legal basis for addressing water use, water pollution control and ecological • lack of clear assignment of policy responsibilities among government ministries and agencies (Yang and Griffiths 2010) ;
• lack of effective cross-sectoral and trans-jurisdictional coordination );
• inability of basin commissions to coordinate across jurisdictions, so they cannot override the interests of jurisdictions such as provinces and municipalities (Shen 2004; Song et al. 2010; Zhou 2006 );
• low level of stakeholder and public participation in river basin management (Yang and Griffiths 2010) .
All these deficiencies are at play in creating the pollution problems that led Shanghai to decide to draw water from the Changjiang rather than the Huangpujiang, to locate intake pipes in a location subject to tidal intrusions, and finally to see those intrusions exacerbated by large-scale water withdrawals from the Changjiang.
Superimposed on these administrative deficiencies is a penchant for large technological solutions that are easier to implement than sets of micro-scale adjustments. Such solutions are also symbols of modernisation, development, and state power (Dwivedi 2002 , Escobar 2003 , Fisher 1995 , Hussain 2008 . They create employment, and channel public monies into enterprises in which individuals in governments may have pecuniary interests (Webber 2012) . They are preferred for cultural reasons too: the Chinese state has a long history of bureaucrats-as-experts (in particular engineers, who dominate the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party as well as the river basin commissions). Whatever the underlying attitudes, tendencies to build dams, pipelines and other large infrastructure projects are deeply embedded within the structures of decision making within China (Needham 1986 , Elvin 1993 Month 1 is January. 152x127mm (72 x 72 DPI)
